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“Fallibility and Authority”1 
 
Sherrilyn Roush 
 
Over the centuries since the modern scientific revolution that started with 
Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, two things have changed that 
have required reorientation of our assumptions and re-education of our 
reflexes.  First, we have learned that even the very best science is fallible; 
eminently successful theories investigated and supported through the best 
methods, and by the best evidence available, might be not just incomplete 
but wrong. That is, it is possible to have a justified belief that is false. 
Second, we have learned that it is impossible, even for scientists, to 
maintain the Enlightenment ideal of “thinking for oneself” on every matter 
about which we want to have, and do think we have, knowledge; the 
volume of information involved makes us all epistemically dependent on 
others. (Kant 1996) Scientists in practice have adjusted to these 
developments much more easily than have lay people. It is also easier to 
adjust in scientific practice than it is to explain these matters explicitly and 
accurately to others. To do so it is helpful to consider our epistemological 
situation precisely, and to understand the broader cultural ideas and 
historical forces at work in modern science and its public reception.  
When scientists present results and arguments in public, responses 
run the gamut from reflexive trust to indiscriminate mistrust. The extremes 
of this spectrum of response have destructive consequences, and ignorance 
of the way science works and of the primary scientific subject matter 
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encourages these extremes. Ignorance about how science works can be 
reduced somewhat by greater education of the public. However, the 
audience’s relative ignorance of a specific topic will always and 
necessarily, because the scientist always has more knowledge of her 
subject matter than a layperson does. This creates what may seem an 
unsolvable problem, for how can the layperson exercise rationality in 
deciding to believe what a scientist says? If the layperson were in a 
position to evaluate whether the scientist should be believed, then he 
wouldn’t need the scientist but could figure out the answer himself! It 
seems that the layperson has the choice of blind trust or blind mistrust. In 
considering epistemic dependence below, we will see that this problem is 
only apparent. This is a good thing, since the scientist herself faces the 
same situation; she is in a layperson-expert relation to many other 
scientists.  
 
Cynicism and errors concerning the admission of fallibility 
One key flashpoint in the public reception of science is the admission of 
fallibility. When, in addition to stating results, scientists admit that they or 
their predecessors have been wrong in the past or that they might be 
wrong now, they are often greeted with one of two curiously opposite 
responses. One is an abject skepticism that concludes that no one, 
scientists included, knows anything. Another is the confident conclusion 
that one is justified in believing whatever hypothesis one chooses. Both 
responses imply a leveling of authority, since in either case the scientist is 
taken to know no better than anyone else. Both the thoroughgoing 
skepticism and the personal confidence are usually defended by the 
familiar claims that “they haven’t proved it” and “it’s just a theory.”  
The word “proof” is properly reserved for mathematical and 
logical arguments, where the standard for success is that the premises rule 
out all possible alternative conclusions, that is, ensure that it is logically 
impossible for the conclusion to be false. Proof is an infallibilist standard 
because it requires ruling out any possibility of error in order to be 
counted as successful at gaining knowledge or justified belief. This 
standard is typically being invoked when the claim is made that scientists 
haven’t proved their theories, for in such cases this is stated not as the 
obvious fact it is, but as an accusation intended to undermine the epistemic 
status of scientific theories. Such undermining could occur, though, only if 
proof, in the mathematical sense, was a standard appropriate to science. 
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By contrast, fallibilism says that we can have justified belief in a 
proposition p even if our evidence about p does not rule out the possibility 
that p is false. The reasonableness of this view depends in part on the 
distinction between possibility and probability; to admit that one might  be 
wrong is not to say that this is likely. Scientists, like all human beings, are 
in fact fallible – might be wrong – but it does not follow from this that 
they do not have knowledge, unless an unrealistic infallibilist standard is 
assumed. That one is not ten feet tall does not imply that one must be ten 
feet tall in order to succeed at basketball.  
Infallibilism clearly supports the extreme responses to scientific 
testimony, for if we do require infallibility in order to count a person as 
justified at all, then the admission that we are not perfect implies that 
scientists achieve no distinctions at all among better- and worse-supported 
theories; analogously, if God is dead, and God was the only possible 
ground for morality, then everything is indeed permitted. For scientists, 
who have experience of the detailed work of gathering, eliciting, and 
judging better and worse evidence, the conclusion that there are no 
distinctions – that without epistemic perfection we have no knowledge at 
all – is foolish. However, for those without knowledge of and experience 
with scientific discussions, this process is a black box, so they have a 
harder time accepting the gradations that fallibilism requires. The 
infallibilist mistake thus undermines the perceived authority of scientific 
results.  
Although assuming an infallibilist standard betrays a deep 
misunderstanding of the way empirical investigation works, the inference 
is a psychological instinct that has been with even the most intellectually 
sophisticated people until a century or so ago, and initially it had a clear 
rationale.  During and after the first modern scientific revolution it was 
often believed and explicitly argued that the attempts at gaining 
knowledge of the world that came before Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and 
Newton had not only led to false theories but were not science at all; the 
ancients and medievals did not conduct themselves in the methodical and 
empirical way that the new giants had. Indeed that was why, it was 
thought, they had not made the astonishing leaps of progress the new 
physicists achieved; the reason they had come up with false conclusions 
was that they were not following the scientific method. (Bacon 2000; 
Descartes 1998, 2000; Newton 1999)   
 The modern revolution thus made it easy to believe that because 
we did follow the scientific method our conclusions would not later be 
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found to be far off the mark. Thus, a presumption existed that the new 
physical theories, of mechanics and subsequently those of 
electromagnetism and thermodynamics, would never need to be revised. 
They would certainly need augmentation and filling out as scientists 
continued to explore and accumulate knowledge of more aspects of the 
world, but the mechanisms were right, and what remained was mopping 
up. One could make mistakes of detail, of course, but if one used the 
scientific method one would not come up with patently false scientific 
theories. 
 With the 20th century, and the theories of relativity and quantum 
mechanics, this view had to yield in the face of a second massive 
revolution in modern physics. (Reichenbach 1942) The force model that 
had been used in mechanics and electricity and magnetism, while 
remaining just as successful in familiar domains of application, is not a 
correct picture of what is happening behind appearances when a planet 
orbits the sun or an electron interacts with a proton. This development 
made it impossible any longer to explain why our predecessors came up 
with strictly speaking false pictures by appeal to the idea that they were 
not doing science – what would science be if we had to say that Newton 
was not doing it? Rather, one had to conclude that even the greatest 
science is fallible; it may yield false, even if successful, models at any 
level of generality, even if the practitioners make no mistakes of inference 
or method, that is, even if they are justified in their beliefs. 
 Scientists are usually comfortable with this revised understanding 
of the way science works, physicists freely admitting, for example, that the 
Standard Model of particle physics is not the final theory (due to a surfeit 
of adjustable parameters). Physicists also freely admit that Relativity and 
Quantum Mechanics do not fully mesh, implying that neither is the final 
theory and that new concepts are probably needed. Yet despite the implicit 
admission that our best theories are strictly speaking false, there is every 
reason to think that these theories get a lot right, that they contain crucial 
building blocks for the next stages which will be retained in the new 
theories. Scientists are not only quite comfortable with the early twentieth 
century revision of deep theories, but are expecting, or at least dreaming 
for, such deep revisions to come around again. 
 This combination of attitudes can make fallibilism seem more 
puzzling, even paradoxical. How could it make sense to be confident in 
one’s theory, and simultaneously to be confident that something in it is 
false, especially when one is not sure where the false parts will be found to 
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be? This is analogous to the so-called “preface paradox,” in which a 
person who has written a book, and is confident in each of its claims due 
to the arguments for each of those results, also admits in the preface of the 
book that it is likely that at least one of those many, many claims is wrong. 
How, it is asked, can one assert the conjunct propositions p1, p2, …, pn and 
also assert that at least one of these conjuncts is false?  
Indeed, one cannot do this consistently if what it is to believe or 
assert is to have or present 100% confidence in each of these claims. This 
is not consistent because the claims in question are logically contradictory; 
all of the claims of your book  are true if and only if not one of them is 
false. However, one need not, and should not, imagine belief or assertion 
in this way. The author may be very confident in each of the claims of her 
book without being 100% certain of any of them. Similarly, she need not 
be certain that there is a mistake somewhere in order to be highly 
confident that there is. This more realistic way of understanding what a 
person is saying when she notes her fallibility even while making bold 
assertions dissolves the supposed paradox (Roush 2010), and is perfectly 
consistent with understanding rationality as requiring that a person’s 
degrees of belief be probabilistically coherent, that is, relate to each other 
in the way required by the probability axioms. (Jeffrey 2004) 
 We can see this as follows. If a person has 99% confidence in each 
of the claims of her book, it will be not only possible but indeed obligatory 
for her to have high confidence that at least one of those claims is wrong. 
This is because the probability of a conjunction is the product of the 
probability of the conjuncts (if the conjuncts are independent, which can 
be assumed here without loss of generality), and the product of fractions 
less than one gets smaller very rapidly as the number of fractions 
increases. It would take only 59 conjuncts for a person with 99% 
confidence in each of them to be obliged to have approximately 95% 
confidence that one of them is wrong. Books typically contain more than 
59 sentences. If we wonder why scientists don’t feel the need to put 
explicit fallibility notices in journal papers the explanation may be as 
simple as that papers do not contain as many claims as books do.  
Of course, if a person is 100% certain of each of her claims, then 
no matter how many there are the product of the confidences in them will 
also be 100%. (1n = 1, for all n.) It follows probabilistically that she is 
obliged to have zero confidence that any of them is false. However, if her 
confidence is 100%, then probability forbids her from ever revising those 
beliefs, no matter what empirical evidence arises. This person we are now 
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imagining has moral certainty, so she would not have been inclined to 
admit fallibility on these matters in the first place. This character would 
not have written the imagined preface, so there is no paradox in this case 
either. 
 
Public cynicism about revision 
Scientists are rational in expecting revision of some of their hypotheses 
and theories while being confident about each of them. However, in the 
public reception of science the phenomenon of revision is another 
problematic flashpoint. For many years the public was told that hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT) was good for middle-aged women. More 
recently, due to a study that surprised the medical establishment, this view 
has been revised to say that the therapy brings significant increase in the 
risk of breast cancer and stroke. (Beral et al. 2002, Beral et al. 2003) 
Apparent reversals of scientific claims happen frequently, if not always so 
dramatically, and a layperson’s response to witnessing this is often to 
mistrust all scientific results – scientists can’t make up their minds! Why 
should we take them seriously today when they are liable to tell us the 
opposite tomorrow? If one is ignorant about how science works, as well as 
of the subject matter, then this response has an unfortunate plausibility. 
 This cynical, or at least exasperated, response to revisions rests 
partly on mistaken assumptions about scientific inquiry and partly on 
unfortunate distortions wrought by the marketplace, for which science gets 
blamed. The first type of mistake occurs when overly generic statements 
of scientific results make it look as if new research contradicts old 
research when it does not. Second, there is a mistaken belief that revision 
is an indication of something bad or unreliable about science. Finally, 
because human beings crave simple, definite answers and sure solutions, 
journalists are encouraged to bring satisfaction by overstating results, and 
companies stand to make a profit by overselling tentative and limited 
conclusions about efficacy. Overstated conclusions are more likely to turn 
out false in the course of time and thus contribute to a mistaken 
impression of dramatic revision on the part of scientists. Scientists do 
revise claims. However, they revise less dramatically and less often than it 
appears. 
 If we state early scientific conclusions about  HRT as the generic 
claim that it is good for middle-aged women, this will be in direct 
contradiction with later finding any respect in which HRT is bad for such 
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a woman. However, claims that HRT is good for treating hot flashes and 
preventing osteoporosis – which have largely stood the test of time – are 
not contradicted by the later finding that hormone therapy is bad with 
respect to breast cancer and stroke. Thus if the earlier claims are stated at 
the warranted specificity, then we see that what we had with the news of 
the 2002 study showing greater risks of breast cancer and stroke  was not a 
revision but an expansion of our knowledge of the effects of this 
treatment.  
Ignoring the specifics of a sequence of scientific results can make 
them look contradictory when they are not. Hormone therapy, like 
anything else, can be good for one thing and bad for another with no 
contradiction. However, the promise to women that they could be 
“feminine forever” and the desire of doctors to help patients in whatever 
way possible created a market for pharmaceutical companies to pursue 
their natural inclination to make money. The feedback of each of these 
three groups to each other created confidence in overgeneralized claims, 
which was unfortunate for some women and also contributed to a 
misleading impression that science is unreliable.  
There is another way that scientific claims can be revised which 
involves a merely apparent contradiction of the previous view. One may 
find, for example, that HRT increases the risk of cardiovascular disease on 
average. However, one may also, or subsequently, find that the average 
hides important variation, for example that though HRT given in later 
years increases this risk, when the therapy is given in early menopause it 
decreases the risk. Or we may find that different preparations of the 
hormones – including or not including progestagen, for example – makes a 
big difference to the risks. The greater specificity of the new results can 
support different recommendations than practitioners gave earlier – an 
early menopausal woman now having benefit and much less risk than 
expected. However, in neither case do the new findings contradict the 
previous claims. It remains true that HRT carries this risk of 
cardiovascular disease on average, even while it carries benefit for people 
with more specific traits, and relatively high risk for those that lack those 
traits. Careful reporting of results at the warranted level of specificity  can 
help to avoid the false impression that scientists are changing their minds.  
Of course, the kind of revision in which a newly accepted 
hypothesis or theory flatly contradicts, and does not redeem, the old one 
also happens. Wegner’s geological theory of continental drift was directly 
denied for some time, and later accepted. This kind of revision is perhaps 
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hardest for the layperson to resist becoming cynical about. How much can 
we trust scientists’ current claims when they change their minds 180 
degrees even about big things? However, revisions, even dramatic ones, 
are a straightforward and indeed necessary consequence of progress in 
empirical investigation. This is because induction – inference from 
incomplete evidence, as in empirical science – is non-monotonic: 
additional evidence can undermine the previous claim that the total 
evidence supports a given hypothesis, and thereby undermine our 
justification for asserting it. As the total set of evidence increases, the 
probability of a given hypothesis relative to the total evidence set can go 
up, and down, and even up and down again and again. In such cases 
changing our confidence accordingly at each new stage is the only 
appropriate response to the new evidence.  (Koons 2009) 
This erodability of inductive inference stands in contrast to 
deductive inference: from the facts that all men are mortal and that 
Socrates is a man it follows that Socrates is mortal. Adding further 
premises, that is, new evidence, can never undermine the legitimacy of 
that inference. We might discover that not all men are mortal, but that 
would involve a rejection of one of the premises. Monotonicity means that 
there is no possible additional fact that could show that it does not follow 
from the premises that Socrates is a man and all men are mortal that 
Socrates is mortal.  
Importantly, though it is a consequence of the erosion of an 
induction that we are no longer justified in believing the conclusion as 
strongly as we were before, the erodability of induction attaches to the 
inference, not the conclusion. The new evidence that undermines our 
previous justification need not falsify the conclusion. This is why the 
addition of new evidence at a still later stage could increase the probability 
of the conclusion again.  
For example, if our only evidence was thousands of swans, all of 
which were white, as it was for Europeans before they encountered 
Australia, we would be justified in concluding that all swans are white, 
even though as a matter of fact they are not. We can find the conclusion 
false by going to Australia, but our justification for believing all swans are 
white can be undermined without finding a counterexample. For example, 
we may notice that color is often variable within other species. This does 
not tell us there is a black swan, but it does say that observing a bunch of 
white swans does not by itself justify the same degree of belief that they 
all are white that it did before. This phenomenon, called cross-induction, 
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in which a legitimate inductive inference is undermined by further 
evidence that does not necessarily contradict the conclusion, is crucial to 
understanding why the fact that scientists revise their hypotheses and 
theories does not mean their assertions are not or were not justified, or that 
we are not justified basing our decisions upon them.  
Whether one is justified or not in making an assertion does not 
depend on whether an all-knowing God would have made the assertion, 
but on whether one has drawn an appropriate conclusion from the 
evidence one has. Thus, justification of a belief is relative to a body of 
evidence. This means that even when new evidence makes a different 
conclusion justified, this does not show that one had not been justified in 
one’s former belief; one had a different evidence set then, and different 
conclusions are justified when the bodies of evidence are different. Thus, 
the fact that scientists revise their hypotheses and theories – that they used 
to believe one thing and now believe another – does not imply that any of 
their beliefs are not justified at the time they are held. Different beliefs can 
be justified at the two times as long as the scientists have different sets of 
evidence at the two different times.  
Given the erodability of the best inductive inference, and given 
that there is an infinite amount of possible empirical evidence we will not 
reach the end of, it would be suspicious if scientists did not revise their 
views over time; it would suggest they were not increasing their store of 
evidence sufficiently or sufficiently openly and rigorously. Thus, seeing 
scientists revise their views is a good thing and should be reassuring. 
Our evidence is always incomplete, and thus our most justified 
beliefs are permanently liable to revision. This can be a difficult 
phenomenon to accept, but everyday life is also full of examples of it. It 
can be dramatic to discover evidence that a close friend is untrustworthy. 
Yet we do not consider that we were unjustified in formerly believing the 
person was trustworthy (unless the new evidence was something we think 
we should have seen all along). We think we were unlucky, but not 
unjustified, to put ourselves in dependence on that person. It is the same 
when we make decisions on the basis of the testimony of the best 
scientists. We take a gamble, and may not in the end get what we want, 
but that does not mean we or they were not justified in taking that risk. It 
is also possible and common to discover evidence that the evidence 
against our trusted friend does not have the significance we had, quite 
rationally, attached to it. Perhaps the stealthy phone calls to one’s husband 
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turn out to be followed by a surprise party that the two of them had been 
organizing. This would provide a cross-induction. 
Once again, though old evidence combined with the new evidence 
does not support one’s old conclusion that the friend was untrustworthy, it 
does not say that that conclusion was not justified at the earlier time on the 
basis of the smaller evidence set. Moreover, the new evidence does not 
logically imply that one’s suspicious hypothesis about the friend was false. 
Further evidence – such as stealthy phone calls continuing after the 
surprise party – could make a new total evidence set that supports the 
original conclusion that one’s friend is untrustworthy. This is our life with 
incomplete evidence; changing our beliefs, and changing them again, is 
sometimes the rational thing to do.  (Roush 2010)  
Of course, in the absence of continued stealthy phone calls, or 
similarly suspicious behavior, it would be quite irrational to withhold trust 
in one’s friend after the party. The evidence set one has does not support 
that mistrust; untrustworthiness is merely a logical possibility. Similarly, it 
is irrational to withhold trust, of the appropriate probabilistic sort, in an 
announced scientific result in the absence of evidence that specifically 
casts doubt on the justification of that result. The blank observation that 
scientists have been wrong before does not justify skepticism about 
specific conclusions. The generic fact merely that one was wrong before 
about one’s friend does not justify believing now that she is 
untrustworthy: indeed, what one had been wrong about before was 
precisely that she was untrustworthy, and that error certainly does not give 
one reason to believe she is untrustworthy now.    
 
Probability and responsibility 
 If hormone therapy is unqualifiedly good, or unqualifiedly bad, then a 
doctor’s decision whether to recommend it and a patient’s decision 
whether to undergo it are easy. Another reason hazardous overstatements 
of scientific results are attractive is a wish that our decisions would be 
simple, even that the facts, perhaps even the scientist, would make our 
decisions for us. However, it is never possible for the facts or the scientist 
(qua scientist) to make our decisions for us, even when our beliefs are 
certain and unqualified. The qualifications that accompany responsible 
reports of scientific results simply bring this into sharper focus. 
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 Hormone therapy is good for some things and bad for others. That 
is, it has both benefits and risks. To take the treatment is to accept both, 
and whether one should do this depends on how much one values the 
benefits and how much one dislikes the risks. No fact about the world 
determines these evaluations. When the world will not satisfy all of a 
person’s goals at once – when a complex of benefits and risks is in 
question -- it is obvious that the subject has a burden to decide on a 
ranking of her preferences. (Peterson 2009) 
 An analogous point applies to the fact that, especially in the 
domains most relevant to policy and to the decisions of ordinary life, 
scientists typically present their results as probabilities, not certain 
predictions about the effects of one thing upon another. Probability can 
generate frustration and the feeling that one is not being given the answer 
to the question, that the scientist is hedging her bets to avoid 
responsibility. However, the report of probabilities is typically not hedging 
but an effort to be as accurate as possible about what is known and to 
assert no more than is known. Any other form of address would be 
misleading, and indeed irresponsible. (Howson and Urbach 1996, Talbott 
2008) Frustration at this situation may come again from a wish or 
expectation that scientists would make our practical decisions for us. But 
even if there were not probabilities but certainties, the question what to do 
would not follow from facts alone. Suppose the following were certainties: 
if a rainforest is lost, then three cities will be under water within 20 years, 
and saving a rainforest has zero cost. Then the decision what to do is 
obvious, but only because we place greater than zero value on cities, a 
value judgment that does not depend on scientific testimony.  
 
Authority and rationality 
Over the period since Copernicus there has been a strain of belief that has 
not been revised, especially among the general public. This is the 
conviction that it is epistemically superior to think for oneself, to depend 
on one’s own reasoning in determining what to believe. A romantic view 
of science, in which the genius does everything in isolation and 
independently of everyone else, is also a part of this legacy. The idea has 
an august lineage. Long before the 18th century Enlightenment – the Age 
of Reason in which we were exhorted to apply our own minds instead of 
trusting in authority – Martin Luther declared “Here I stand, I can do no 
other,” setting his own conscience against the deliverances of the church 
institution. Galileo similarly whispered about the earth “Yet it moves,” at 
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the trial for his heliocentric heresy in which he had officially recanted. 
René Descartes famously instructed us how to build the foundations of all 
science on the knowledge simply that one thinks, and thought it imperative 
in building that foundation that one let go of beliefs held merely by habit, 
custom, and trust in others. One must evaluate every brick of the edifice 
oneself if it is to continue sturdy. (Descartes 1984, 1998) Responsibility 
for and authority over one’s own beliefs – freedom of conscience – has 
come to have an even more robust life outside of science in political 
institutions, the most obvious manifestation of which is the first 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which protects the individual’s 
freedom of speech, and expression more broadly. 
The idea of the individual’s freedom of conscience is a powerful 
and beneficial meme, but there are two distinctions that tend to be 
overlooked, with destructive consequences for the reception of science. 
One is the difference, discussed above, between values, or preferences, 
and matters of fact.  Whether preserving as many species as possible is a 
worthy goal is a question of values. What will happen to the rainforests if 
CO2 is not decreased is a question of fact. Most discussions involve 
complex combinations of the two kinds of belief – in deciding whether 
preserving as many species as possible is a worthy goal one will consider 
other factual beliefs one has, such as whether the survival of human beings 
depends on it. Identifying and distinguishing fact versus value questions 
within a discussion is useful because the tools for addressing the two kinds 
of issues are usually different, and the scientist is not per se responsible for 
our value decisions.  
Another neglected distinction is between legality and rationality; 
the former does not imply the latter, and this becomes especially apparent 
when our presumption of freedom of conscience bleeds from the domain 
of values into that of facts. There the idea is problematic, and on some 
understandings of the claim it is plain wrong. If one acknowledges that 
scientists have more knowledge than one does about a topic, as is most 
often the case where their expertise is relevant at all, then it is not rational 
to form an opinion based solely on one’s own cogitations. Thanks to the 
first amendment it is perfectly legal for one to believe and announce just 
whatever one wants to about the way the world is. That does not mean that 
just any belief one professes is rational. 
We would not have most of the knowledge we typically assume we 
have about the world without placing ourselves in dependence on others in 
forming our beliefs. One thinks one knows that smoking causes cancer, 
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but observing that the two smokers one knew got cancer has no evidential 
significance to the question. Since one did not carry out studies on the 
possible causal connection between smoking and cancer, one’s legitimate 
confidence about this connection comes from accepting the results and 
trusting the expertise of other people. Similarly, one knows that the Grand 
Canyon exists, and that cheetahs run fast, even if one has never laid eyes 
on either phenomenon, and this is because of trust that other people have 
verified these things. 
Every scientist today is likewise epistemically dependent on other 
scientists in order to be able to make discoveries at all. For if a scientist 
had to repeat every experiment of the predecessors in her area in order to 
be counted as knowing the results they reported, she would never have the 
time to do a new experiment furthering our understanding. Scientists could 
not build on the discoveries of others and our knowledge would not grow. 
Descartes notwithstanding, there is nothing irrational or deficient in this 
epistemic interdependence among people. The volume and complexity of 
information that science deals with in its current state is staggering; it 
would be impossible even for a Galileo to hold it all in his mind, much 
less to evaluate step by step. (Hardwig 1985)  
Epistemic interdependence among scientists can lead observers to 
the conclusion that the results they offer are not so much true as merely a 
consensus opinion, and thus not necessarily better than the belief that the 
earth was flat, which was also once held by a majority. Thereby once 
again the reports of scientists may be taken to be no more credit-worthy 
than one’s own opinions. However, while being in a group makes group-
think possible it does not make it necessary. In fact, there are both cultural 
and formal safeguards against mutual internal reinforcement of the 
opinions of scientists in a community. For example, scientists are 
rewarded for coming to hypotheses and conclusions that are distinct from 
and even challenge those of their rivals, and peer review of publication 
puts work under the scrutiny and power of one’s rivals. (Lamont 2010, 
Kassirer and Campion 1994) Such mechanisms tend to prevent consensus 
from coming too cheaply. Any particular safeguard may fail at a given 
time, of course, but the mere fact that scientists form a mutually 
interacting and interdependent group does not mean that their conclusions 
are unrelated to the truth. If cooperation within a group takes a healthy and 
mutually critical form, then the group can be expected to be more likely to 
achieve its goal than the same set of individuals could if they were not 
interacting. (Kitcher 2001) 
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If one is in an epistemically inferior position then trusting others’ 
testimony is the only way it is possible to be rational, but how can this 
trust actually be rational? Since one does not know the subject matter, how 
can one know whether the expert does either? It appears that this trust 
would have to be adopted on blind faith. This skeptical conundrum 
contributes to resistance to seeing ourselves as dependent on the 
knowledge of others. 
Fortunately, the problem is merely apparent. An analogy will 
expose the mistake in this line of reasoning. Suppose one is not a great 
cook but likes fine food, so one goes to restaurants, sometimes restaurants 
one has not been to before. One trusts that neither the restauranteer, nor 
the chef, nor the waiter is trying to poison one, and that all are competent 
at delivering food that is at least safe. One believes this even though these 
people are perfect strangers. Often one is even confident that the food will 
be of high quality despite never having been to this restaurant before. How 
could one be justified in these judgments when one has never tasted their 
products? Even if one watched the preparation, that would give little 
grounds for judging the quality, since one is not a cook oneself. We 
frequently trust our very lives to perfect strangers without having 
personally verified any of our assumptions about them or their expertise. 
The point is not to become skeptical of unfamiliar restaurants, but 
rather to recognize how rational our trust in such cases can be and usually 
is. We do not have to know the chef, or know what he knows, and we do 
not have to taste the food, in order to have reasons to believe that we will 
not be poisoned and that the food will be something between tolerable and 
very fine. Typically one would not have trust that the food will be high 
quality without first having testimony from a restaurant review, or a friend 
known to have sufficiently high standards, that the place served good 
food. As for poisoning, the very fact that one does not know the 
restauranteer or her staff means that they probably have no incentive to 
kill one. And though one does not normally think about it, one reason to 
trust that the food will not cause illness is the knowledge that the health 
department makes regular inspections, and code violations carry the threat 
of shutting the establishment down. And if more than a few people 
actually got sick at a restaurant, the news would travel and might put the 
restaurant out of business before the reports of illness even got to one.  
The incentive structure all of this creates gives you strong reasons 
to feel confident that the food will not make you sick. That we are 
epistemically dependent on other people’s judgments does not imply that 
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we are irrational or trust blindly without reasons. We can evaluate whether 
to believe a given witness, and evaluate the general system that produces 
these witnesses, via cues that are accessible to those who are not the 
witnesses themselves. These cues do not rule out the logical possibility 
that the restaurant will serve you bad food, or even that it will poison you. 
However, as fallibilists we do not require fulfilling that standard to be 
counted as justified. 
The fact that I do not judge everything for myself – that I don’t 
know what the chef knows, that I do not taste the food before I first taste 
the food – does not imply that I do not judge anything for myself. For 
example, I will be the judge of whether a given friend has dining standards 
high enough or similar enough to mine to be taken as an authority on 
where to eat. I will have shared meals with her before and thereby build up 
evidence about her tastes. One similarly judges a food critic by either his 
track record or reputation. I do not verify with my own eyes or tongue 
every claim or meal that I trust. Nevertheless, I remain the ultimate judge 
of what to believe or eat, in an obvious and important sense: I decide how 
to weigh my sources of information for their credibility, and I can do this 
on the basis of evidence and arguments.  Epistemic dependence does not 
imply that I do not or should not think for myself, even in the extreme case 
where I know nothing at all about the primary subject matter. Thinking for 
oneself remains a rational obligation, even when the deliberation is only 
about whom to trust.  
On any matter except what one immediately senses in the here and 
now, one’s evidence and reasons for belief will always be indirect. The 
kind of rationality a layperson exercises in deciding to believe a scientific 
expert is not different in kind from that we exercise continuously in daily 
life. That the best justification one can get for believing a statement of 
physics is to have good reasons for believing that the scientific expert has 
good reasons to believe that statement, is no different in kind from the fact 
that the best one can do for justification of one’s belief that one was born 
on a certain day is to have good reasons to believe that one’s parents have 
good reasons to believe one was born on that day.  
There is a difference of degree, of course. We are more conscious 
of the concession of authority that we make in deferring to scientists 
because the disparity of expertise is extreme. We know what it is like to 
experience the day on which a person was born, and can thus trust a 
parent’s testimony with a sense that we know on what sort of basis he or 
she knows the day. One who has not engaged in science does not have 
in  
Leadership in Science and Technology: A Reference Handbook;  
William Sims Bainbridge, ed., SAGE Press, 2012. 
   
16 
 
much to go on to imagine what kind of thing scientists do to procure their 
evidence and what good grounds for scientific claims look like. This can 
lead to discomfort, but does not mean that trust is irrational. Some people 
cannot imagine how to cook, yet they can have good reasons to trust chefs. 
In summary, a mistaken infallibilist view of knowledge, in which 
one imagines that in order to be justified one is required to have evidence 
that makes it logically impossible to be in error, is the source of much 
cynicism and confusion about science and its expert testimony. Even 
though it remains possible that we are wrong, we are often able to evaluate 
how probable or improbable such error is. After admitting our fallibility 
our options are not believing nothing or believing whatever we want. 
Another source of cynicism comes from witnessing scientists revising 
their conclusions. However, there is less outright retraction than meets the 
eye, and given the necessarily non-monotonic nature of empirical 
inference, it would be highly suspicious if scientists did not revise their 
conclusions since it would suggest they were not acquiring new, diverse 
evidence and evaluating it critically. Witnessing revision should thus be 
reassuring. Finally, no individual can escape dependence on other people 
for the justification of claims about matters of fact. However, although 
scientists do in general deserve to be granted authority over their topics of 
expertise, in virtue of the fact that they know more, this does not in fact 
undermine the individual’s ability and responsibility to think for himself. 
He must evaluate the credibility of sources using the cues available for this 
purpose, such as the incentive structure of the research and whether there 
is consensus in the community. A person can have his own good reasons 
to believe, but he also can have good reason to believe in virtue of having 
good reason to believe that others have good reason to believe. 
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